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Refugees are not terrorists. They are often the first victims of terrorism. 
Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
I. INTRODUCTION: TERRORISM IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
It is ironic that a concept as widely cited and spoken about as terrorism 
should defy definition. While it is often easy to identify acts that are in 
some manner a form of terrorism, the international community has
struggled to arrive at a universally acceptable definition. Attempts to 
define terrorism have continued since the late 1930s.1 Political 
assassinations in the 1920s and 1930s prompted the League of Nations 
(the League) to address the threat of terrorism. While the League 
successfully drafted two separate treaties on the issue,2 it could not
attain consensus among members for ratification and implementation of
the treaty that specifically defined terrorism. The United Nations (UN) has
also made many attempts to define terrorism. And although the international
community has written more than thirteen different multilateral treaties 
on what activities fall within the ambit of terrorist activity, a generic 
definition of terrorism remains elusive. 3 
The events of 9/11 reiterated the urgency and necessity to define 
terrorism. Terror was no longer an obscure and shapeless force—it was 
demonstrably fiendish and evil. In Samuel Huntington’s terminology, 9/11
was indeed the launch of the “clash of civilizations.”4 It marked the 
arrival of religious extremism in international warfare, which itself was 
no longer restricted to states. Prior to 9/11, groups such as the People’s 
Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) and the Hezbollah had successfully carried
out acts of terror against states such as Iran, Israel, and Lebanon. 
However, 9/11 was the first time that a non-State actor, the Al Qaeda,
had been successful in causing substantial damage to infrastructure and 
facilities of a State outside of the geographical location it operated in.
Still, the impact of 9/11 was not intended to be nor limited to mere




 4. Michael Dunn, The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the ‘War on Terror’, 49th Parallel, 
Vol. 20 (2006-2007), available at http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/ issue20/Dunn.pdf.
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economic and infrastructural damage. The extent of paranoia created by 
the attacks resulted in the start of the long and yet unconcluded “War on
Terror” to tackle the rise of terrorism and, by default, religious extremism.
National security, counter terrorism, and principles of State sovereignty
became the driving force behind foreign policy and legislative decisions, 
trumping every fundamental framework of rule of law and human rights.
The “War on Terror” also holds the dubious distinction of creating 
inextricable linkages between refugee and asylum law and principles of
national security. This policy initiative found an unlikely precursor in 
the UN Security Council (UNSC). In the aftermath of 9/11, UNSC
Resolution 1373 reiterated the necessity to exclude terrorists from asylum
systems the world over.5 Indeed, as post-9/11 legislative practices in
various national and regional jurisdictions demonstrate, the restrictive
and often narrow determination of “national security interests” has led to 
the tightening of eligibility bars for admittance as refugees. This is 
starkly demonstrated by the decline in refugee admittance figures around 
the world, but especially in the United States—where in 2002 and 2003, 
against an authorized admission of 70,000 refugees, only 27,029 (2002) 
and 28,422 (2003) were admitted.6 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
delicately balances the right of an individual to seek asylum vis-à-vis the
concerns of State sovereignty. Thus, while the provision articulates the 
individual right to seek asylum in a country other than one’s own, no 
obligation is cast on member states of the UN to grant asylum to every
claimant. This norm has been further elaborated in Article 33 of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) as the 
norm of non-refoulement.7 This norm has also been guaranteed absolute 
5. “3. . . (f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before 
granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, 
facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts; (g) Ensure, in conformity
with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or
facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as 
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.” See S.C. Res. 
1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
6. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Counterproductive and Counterintuitive 
Counterterrorism: The Post- September 11 Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 
84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 & n.47, 1130–31 & nn.60–63 (2007). 
7. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 (stating “‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
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protection under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment (1984 Convention).8 However, as the “War on 
Terror” has expanded, this hitherto accepted norm, which also enjoys the
elevated status of “customary international law,”9 has become the subject of
much debate and discussion. Arguments have been raised in the past decade
to justify the right of States to balance interests of national security
against their obligation to honor the norm of non-refoulement.10 
These policy changes give rise to multiple questions—involving not 
only issues of State sovereignty and national security, but also the
precedential value of promoting a rule of law framework largely devoid 
of de minimis protections. They also affect the deeper and abstract
presumptions informing counter terrorism and counter-radicalization
measures. In fact, what are the elements for the crimes of terrorism,
“incitement to terrorism,” and “material support to terrorism?” How can
an individual be held guilty of such an offence if the offence is itself 
undefined or obscurely defined? Can any asylum regime exclude such
individuals from its protection who have allegedly committed the crime 
of terrorism, “incitement to terrorism,” or provided “material support to 
terrorism” without first defining the crimes? Can such exclusion be 
automatic—without assessing the individual circumstances of the case to
determine (a) whether there is a fear of persecution, and (b) the individual 
culpability of the person in question? If yes, on what grounds is such
exclusion based? What role does Article 1F of the 1951 Convention play
in this context—is it an exhaustive provision or can there be additional 
grounds on which exclusion considerations may be assessed? What is
the impact of these debates on the norm of non-refoulement? 
In the decade since 9/11, these questions have been debated and discussed 
by many eminent academics. Most consider that in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, many states adopted a very expansive definition of what constituted
terrorist activity and “material support to terrorism,” thus leading to absurd 
and often, perverse determinations—disproportionately affecting those
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”) (hereinafter 1951 Convention). 
8. G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (stating 
“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”).
9. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as
a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by
the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 
1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, (Jan. 31, 1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/437b6db64.html. 
10. See, e.g., Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and the Non-derogability of
Non-Refoulement, 15 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 5, 5–29 (2003). 
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most in need of protection. Over time, adjudicators have returned to 
more conservative interpretations of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention
for guidance, because as has been rightly recognized in judicial precedent, 
basing decisions on an underlying norm that is not clear automatically 
negated the rule of law.11 While it is easy to change the course of judicial 
pronouncements, adjudicators still must adhere to formal legal provisions 
that incorporate these restrictive provisions and which, despite their
inadequacies, continue to be maintained as part of the legislative framework 
in many states. 
These questions have renewed relevance today—anti-terrorism laws
enacted post-9/11 remain in force in different jurisdictions, and despite
occasional decision of the courts, the apprehension that these laws will
overshadow the institution of asylum remains real. As the composition 
of the ongoing conflicts and participation thereto unequivocally
demonstrates, the “War on Terror” is far from over.  What problematizes 
terrorism in the 21st century is its constantly mutating nature. As Ronen 
indicates, terrorism post-9/11 differs significantly from the traditional 
conceptualization and understanding of terrorism.12 These differences 
are primarily on two major aspects. First, is the rise and proliferation of 
non-State actors like the “Al Qaeda and Affiliated Movements” (AQAM). 
Unlike traditional terrorist outfits, AQAM is not defined by a hierarchical
organizational structure or political and social motives. Rather, the 
organization operates in a decentralized fashion and its goals and objectives
are often defined by extremist religious ideologies or interpretations. The 
former quality significantly enhances AQAM’s flexibility in terms of
recruitment and training of fighters. The killing of Osama bin Laden in 
2011 has only strengthened the raison d’etre behind the ideology of Al 
Qaeda and spurred the organization’s proliferation. Second, while
traditional terrorist outfits used mass casualties as a means of achieving a
particular goal, in the context of post-9/11 terrorist activities, inflicting
large-scale damage to life and property has become a motive in itself. 
Given this background, three factors become very critical. First, the 
burgeoning Syrian refugee crisis across the Middle East, the resurgence
of sectarian violence in Iraq, and the beginning of United States and
 11. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Singh [2002] HCA 7 
(Austl.).
12. See Yael Ronen, Incitement to Terrorist Acts and International Law, 23 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 645, 648–49 (2010). 
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international force withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is extremely likely
that those fleeing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan or other conflict 
hot spots are likely to find themselves embroiled in long Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) proceedings, simply because the level of violence
prevalent in these conflicts gives rise to a strong, albeit rebuttable, 
presumption of involvement of civilians in excludable acts. The second, 
and perhaps more alarming, factor is the rise in radicalism among diaspora
Muslim populations. In a recently released study, the International 
Center for the Study of Radicalization states that since the beginning of
the Syrian conflict in 2011, as many as 2,000–5,500 foreign fighters have
participated in the Syrian conflict, of which 135–590, or 7–11% have
been European Muslims.13 The post-9/11 decade has also witnessed the
rise of homegrown terrorism in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
the European Union, among others—naturalized and second generation 
citizens as well as legal residents have participated in extremist violence,
influenced in some manner by the AQAM, and supported in large part
by indoctrination through social media and radicalization led by religious
leaders within their communities.14 This could lead to expulsion of these
individuals from their respective countries of residence if they are held
liable for participation in terrorist activity. Such individuals are also 
liable to be denied re-admission to their home state territory if they traveled
to a third country to participate in activities, of potentially excludable 
nature. The third, and perhaps the most crucial link in this chasm, is the 
continued existence of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Despite 
declaring his intention to close Guantanamo Bay during his first term in 
office, President Obama has in his second term signed into law such
provisions which make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to shut 
down Guantanamo Bay in the immediate future.15 The longer it takes for
the facility to close, the more likely it is for decisions of war crimes trials to
be challenged in a regular court of law. Already in 2012, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the “material support to terrorism” charge against
Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s driver.16 This decision, if upheld,
 13. Aaron Zelin, European Foreign Fighters in Syria, INT’L CENT. FOR THE STUDY
OF RADICALIZATION (Feb. 4, 2013), http://icsr.info/2013/04/icsr-insight-european­
foreign-fighters-in-syria-2/. 
14. See, e.g., Shazad Ali, Home-Grown Terror in Europe: Threat in the Midst, 
27:2 J. EUR. STUD. (PAK.) 89, 89–122 (July 2011). 
15. NDAA Prevents Closing Guantanamo, Could Lead to Claims of a Right to
Discriminate, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/national­
security/updated-ndaa-prevents-closing-guantanamo-could-lead-claims-right-discriminate. 
16. See generally Alexandra Link, Trying Terrorism: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Material Support, And the Paradox of International Criminal Law, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L.
439 (2013). 
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holds significant potential to alter the legislative and normative framework
under which individuals may be excluded from grant of asylum in the 
United States. 
This paper is structured as follows: Part II traces the development of 
international instruments on the definition of terrorism, terrorist activities 
and “incitement to terrorism.” Part III first explores the normative 
framework of exclusion under the 1951 Convention and how the RSD 
procedure has undergone a notional shift, with exclusion considerations 
becoming more central. The section will then look at the provisions of
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, which contain the exclusion clauses 
and also discuss incorporation of terrorism exception to the asylum law 
framework in the United States. Part IV concludes with the proposition 
that the dangers of expansive interpretation of nebulous terms such as 
terrorism, terrorist activity, and “material support to terrorism” far outweigh 
the benefits that could be derived from pursuing such a policy.




“We can’t define what terrorism is, but we know it when we see it.” 
Justice Potter Stewart, Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964)
The commission of an act of terrorism attracts near-universal 
condemnation, often giving the impression that the offence is amenable
to an universal legal definition. Contrarily, many challenges to defining
terrorism exist. This section first discusses the elements of the crime of
terrorism. It then outlines the many efforts at the UN level to develop a 
common definition of terrorism, and briefly discusses specific conventions 
on different categories of terrorist activities, as well as the progress made
at regional levels in this regard. Finally, it looks at the recent efforts to 
criminalize incitement to terrorism under international law. 
A. Defining Terrorism: Elements of Crime
The crime of terrorism requires both the mental intent (dolus / mens 
rea) and the act (actus reus).17 However, unlike most other offences under 
17. Christian Walter, Defining Terrorism in National and International Law, in
TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY
VERSUS LIBERTY? 23–43 (Cristian Walter et al. eds., 2004). 
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international law, the crime of terrorism requires the elements to be shown 
in two different layers. Like the crime of genocide, terrorism is a crime 
with specific double intent or dolus specialis. 18 Thus, to sustain the charge
of terrorism requires a showing of the intent not only for the specific 
resultant act—hijacking a plane, siphoning off of funds, etc.—but also
for the broader purpose of causing or spreading terror through the eventual
execution of such acts. While it is relatively easy to establish a physical act
that has been committed (hijacking, kidnapping, etc.), the second level
of the offence of terrorism, i.e., causing and/or spreading terror, is more
difficult to establish given its inchoate nature. 
B. Generic Definition of Terrorism: From the League 
  of Nations to the UN 
Kalliopi Koufa, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and 
Terrorism, in her 2001 Report to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, noted that 109 different definitions of 
terrorism had been proposed between 1936 and 1981—none of which
have as yet been adopted.19 In 1937, the League proposed the first
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which 
defined terrorism as, “all criminal acts directed against a State and
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular
persons or a group of persons or the general public.”20 This Convention
was never adopted by members of the League. In 1972, the UN General 
Assembly appointed an ad hoc Committee to draft a comprehensive 
Convention on Terrorism and produce a definition, a task the Committee 
was unable to complete.21 In 1995, the UN General Assembly endorsed
the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, which 
defined terrorism as, ‘. . . criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever 
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature. . .’22 
The 1995 Declaration, although non-binding in nature, remains the 
only international instrument to define terrorism. After adoption of the 
Declaration, most members of the Non-Aligned Movement and 
Organization of Islamic States continued to reiterate the necessity of a
 18. See DUFFY, supra note 1. 
19. Id. at 18 n.4. 
20. Id. at 18–19. 
21. Id. at 19. 
22.  G.A. Res. 49/60, I(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
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separate comprehensive treaty on terrorism. But that the Declaration was
adopted without a vote and thereafter reaffirmed in various UN General 
Assembly Resolutions23 indicates that states did indeed arrive at a general 
consensus on the definition of terrorism.24 
Subsequently, in 1996, pursuant to Resolution 51/210,25 the UN General 
Assembly established a second ad hoc Committee to draft a comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism and present an alternative 
definition of terrorism. The work of this Committee is still ongoing. Per 
the Draft Comprehensive Convention, the Committee proposed to define 
terrorism as “unlawfully and intentionally, caus[ing]: (a) death or serious 
bodily injury to any person; (b) serious damage to public or private 
property, including ... a State or government facility”; or (c) other such 
damage where it is likely to result in major economic loss.26 The
definition further requires that “the purpose of the conduct, by its nature 
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or 
an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”27 The
work of the Committee overlapped with the events of 9/11, but despite 
strong condemnation of 9/11 and a general consensus among the 
international community, member states yet again did not reach a
consensus on the definition of terrorism. While there is debate whether a 
single, generic definition of terrorism under international law is at all 
required, the existing variance in opinions makes uncertain the eventual 
adoption of a generic definition and success of a global convention on 
terrorism.28
 23. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 50/53, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/53 (Dec. 11, 1995); G.A. 
Res. 51/210, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17 1996); G.A. Res. 52/165, ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/52/165 (Dec. 15, 1997); G.A. Res. 53/108, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/108
(Dec. 8, 1998); G.A. Res. 54/110, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/110 (Dec. 9, 1999); G.A. 
Res. 55/158, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/158 (Dec. 12, 2000); G.A. Res. 56/88, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/88 (Dec. 12, 2001); G.A. Res. 57/27, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/27 (Nov.
19, 2002). 
24. See Ben Saul, The Emerging International Law of Terrorism (Sydney Law 
School, Research Paper No. 10/108, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699568. 
25.  G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996). 
26. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 6th sess, Jan. 28–Feb.1, 2002, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/37; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37 (2002). 
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Sameera Singh, Will Acceptance of a ‘Universally Approved Definition’ 
of Terrorism make Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention More Effective in
Excluding Terrorists?, 2:3 J. MIGRATION & REFUGEE ISSUES 91, 91–119 (2006). 
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C. Terrorism: Specific Conventions 
Alongside the prolonged efforts of the UN to draft a comprehensive 
Convention on Terrorism, the international community bolstered its effort
to fight terrorism by promulgating international instruments addressing
specific conduct that falls within the purview of terrorist activity. There 
currently exists at least thirteen such conventions addressing inter alia 
offences on board aircraft or at airports; crimes against internationally
protected persons; hostage taking; and acts aboard ships and at sea. 29 In 
as much as these conventions address the conduct or act that is punishable 
rather than a perpetrator, they create objective legal criteria under which 
individuals can be held liable. It is to be noted that these conventions do 
not penalize the prohibited conduct, but require member states to 
criminalize the specified conduct under domestic law. Additionally,
member states are obligated inter alia to extradite or submit for prosecution 
individuals suspected of having committed the covered offences, and 
cooperate in intelligence and evidence gathering activities.30 
D. Terrorism Regional Conventions 
Regional bodies including the European Union, Arab League, and
African Union have addressed the issue of terrorism, giving rise to 
seven regional conventions. However, only two of the regional bodies 
have chosen to draft conventions incorporating a generic definition for
the term terrorism, while the remaining bodies have chosen to define 
29. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 
205; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature
Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 (adopted on Oct 27, 1979); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 1589 
U.N.T.S. 474; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Mar. l, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721 (1991); International Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. GAOR 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/766 (April 4, 2005). 
30. DUFFY, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
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terrorism by reference to existing treaties and conventions.31 The 1998
Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, defines terrorism as 
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs for
the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror
among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or 
security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or
private installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or aiming to jeopardize 
national resource.32 
After 9/11, the European Union, which had previously promulgated the 
1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,33 adopted 
the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism, which defines terrorism 
as
[I]ntentional acts which, given their nature or their context, may seriously
damage a country or international organization where committed with the aim
of: 
(i) 	 seriously intimidating a population, or
(ii) unduly compelling a Government 	or international organization to
perform or abstain from performing any act, or
(iii) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or
international organization.34
 31. E.g., Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 
Feb. 2, 1971, 37 U.N.T.S. 195; Organization on African Unity (OAU) Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999, 2219 U.N.T.S. 179; South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987. 
32. Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, art. 2, Apr. 22, 1998. 
33. The 1977 Convention, adopted by the Council of Europe, “deals with extradition in
relation to terrorist offences, defined by reference to crimes listed in other conventions. It
provides a list of offences which, for the purposes of the Convention, are considered
‘terrorist offences and in respect of which state parties must extradite suspects, as opposed to
‘political’ offences where generally the duty to extradite does not apply. It also includes 
other offences involving an act of violence against the life, physical integrity or liberty of
a person and against property if the act created a collective danger for persons, where the 
state may extradite thus suspect, but is not obliged to do so.” DUFFY, supra note 1, at 28
n.46. 
34. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, of 13 June 2002 on Combating 
Terrorism, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3. 
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E. Incitement to Terrorism
Until very recently, international regulation of propaganda was largely 
confined to war propaganda, including prohibiting the threat of the use 
of force and requiring states to refrain from intervening in domestic
affairs of other States.35 Under Article 20(1) of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), States are obligated to
prohibit war propaganda by individuals. Under Article 4(a) of the 1969
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
States are required to prohibit incitement of national, racial, or religious 
hatred.36 But none of these measures are sufficiently broad to cover
“incitement to terrorism” in its post-9/11 form. The only existing 
comparable framework for regulation of the offence of incitement is 
contained in the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide (1948 Convention), which was replicated in Statutes of the ad 
hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia37 and Rwanda,38 and of the International
Criminal Court.39 Given that these provisions apply specifically to the 
crime of genocide, it cannot be mutatis mutandis made applicable to the 
crime of incitement of terrorism. “Incitement to terrorism” has thus 
remained largely devoid of regulation. However, post-9/11, States have 
increasingly felt the need to create a legal and policy framework which
not only punishes terrorist activities but helps prevent them as well.
Development in this field of legislative regulation predominantly been in
the European Union and the United Kingdom,40 where long-standing
discrimination against minority Muslim populations has supported the 
growth of homegrown and international terrorism.41 
The first reference to “incitement of terrorism” was contained in the 
1996 Security Council Resolution 51/210, which declared that “knowingly 
financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”42 Shortly after 9/11
 35. See Ronen, supra note 12, at 649–51. 
36. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
37. S.C. Res. 827, art 4(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993). 
38. S.C. Res. 955, art. 2(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 3453th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
39. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(3)(e), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
40. The provisions dealing with incitement to terrorism are contained in the
Terrorism Act, 2000 and amended by the Terrorism Act, 2006. See Shazad, supra note 
14. 
41. See id.
42.  G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 25. 
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occurred, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1373, which replicated the 
language of Resolution 51/210.43 After the 2005 London bombings, the 
United Kingdom sponsored UNSC Resolution 1624 that directly addressed
the issue of incitement to terrorism. The Resolution reiterates that
incitement to terrorism is contrary to the purposes and principles of the
UN, and calls upon member states to prohibit and prevent incitement
to terrorism. The Resolution by itself does not create a binding legal
obligation—unlike Resolution 1373, Resolution 1624 was not taken
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the language of the Resolution
does not imply any binding obligation. However, member states are 
required to report to the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC)44 on the 
steps taken to implement the Resolution. While it has been argued that
the Resolution provides the legal basis for criminalizing “incitement to 
terrorism,” the Resolution does not define the offence of “incitement to 
terrorism,” in contradiction with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.45 
In 2008, to provide member states with guidance on implementation
of the Resolution, the UN Secretary General defined “incitement to
terrorism” as “a direct call to engage in terrorism, with the intention that
this will promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly 
causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist act
occurring.”46 In order to prosecute an individual for “incitement to 
terrorism,” there must be intent and direct encouragement of a third
individual toward commission of a crime in that the speech has to result 
43. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5.
44. As Ronen states, if Resolution 1624 is indeed binding, the CTC should
monitor State practice which encroaches upon protected human rights whilst undertaking
implementation of the Resolution. See Ronen, supra note 12, at 650–51. For Resolution
1373, the CTC decided to engage in dialogue with states and adopted a reporting
mechanism, focused on technical assistance for capacity building. CTC’s reports on 
implementation of Resolution 1624 contain no assessment of State’s practice in light of 
international human rights standards and neither do they relate to any engagement on part
of the CTC with member states to promote best practices, as required under Resolution 1624. 
See S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). See also Ronen, supra
note 12, at 650–51. 
45. This principle, along with the general prohibition of ex post facto law is a 
judicial guarantee that is generally considered indispensable under international law.
Nullum crimnen sine lege prohibits punishment of an act if the act was not an offence at 
the time of commission. With respect to Resolution 1624, the argument remains that in 
as much as the Resolution does not define “incitement to terrorism,” it cannot be the 
basis of its criminalization. 
46. See also Ronen, supra note 12, at 668. 
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in criminal action or should be likely to result in criminal action. The 
Secretary General’s report clearly distinguished between direct “incitement
of terrorism” and other indirect forms—i.e., apologie of terrorism; while 
it criminalizes the former, it does not criminalize indirect forms of
“incitement to terrorism.”  Criminalizing indirect forms of “incitement to 
terrorism” such as apologie or glorification was considered to place 
unnecessary restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression.47 
However, the Resolution itself neither requires member states to take
action against indirect acts of “incitement to terrorism,” nor prohibits 
them from criminalizing such behavior.48 This flexibility accorded by
the Resolution is evident in State practice—eighty-eight states reported 
to the CTC that they had not adopted any new legislation to implement 
the Resolution in their national jurisdictions both because of the non-
binding nature of the Resolution and the potential conflict with the right
to freedom of speech and expression.49  On the other hand, as the 2006 
CTC Report reveals, five out of sixty-nine reporting states indicated that 
criminalization of “incitement to terrorism” in their national jurisdictions 
encompassed statements glorifying or justifying terrorism, i.e., apologie.50 
In addition, six other states reported that their penal laws contained 
prohibitions of public approval or glorification of serious crimes that could 
also be applied to terrorist acts.51 Most states reported penal provisions 
on inchoate crimes such as aiding and abetting, which would be applicable 
to terrorist acts as well.52 
The most significant departure from the Secretary General’s definition 
of “incitement to terrorism” has been by the Council of Europe. In 2005, 
the Council adopted the Convention on Prevention of Terrorism, which
defines “incitement to terrorism” as, ‘the distribution, or otherwise making
available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the
commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not
directly advocating terrorist offenses, causes a danger that one or more 
such offences may be committed.’ 
47. See Eric De Brabandere, The Regulation of Incitement to Terrorism in
International Law, in BALANCING LIBERTY AND SECURITY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS PENDULUM, 
221, 231–32 (L. Hennebel & H. Tigrouda eds., 2012). Under the Genocide Convention, 
as also the Statutes of ICTY, ICTR and the ICC, only direct and public incitement of
genocide is criminalized, not any indirect form of incitement.
48. Id.
 49. KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 58, 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
50. See De Brabendere, supra note 47, at 230. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 228–29.
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Not only did the Council of Europe criminalize all forms of indirect 
incitement, such as glorification or apologie, but the Convention also
states that actual commission of a terrorist offence is irrelevant for an act
to constitute public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment 
for terrorism, or training for terrorism, thus placing incitement squarely 
within the confines of prohibited conduct.53 
As the discussion above demonstrates, controversy has surrounded the 
conceptualization of terrorism under international law. Such incongruity 
only generates deep uncertainty about the precise nature of state
obligations—each member state enjoys leeway to define these concepts
the way it chooses, which effectively undermines the purpose of these
obligations.54 Although Cassese argued that international terrorism has 
now become a customary international law crime that derives its status
from the convergence of norms in international, regional, and national
jurisdictions;55 State practice in this regard is far less convincing. While 
it is likely, as Saul argues, that the present architecture on the crime of 
international terrorism56 will eventually result in a customary international
law crime of international terrorism, but to make it the basis of restrictive 
policies on refugee and asylee admissions, in the absence of a common
understanding of the crime itself, raises serious questions about rule of 
law and exercise of fundamental rights. It is, as French law enforcement 
officials have said, akin to having “opened the universal hunting season
on terrorism without defining it.”57 
III. CAN A TERRORIST EVER BE A REFUGEE?: THE REFUGEE STATUS
DETERMINATION PROCESS
The question is not whether the appellant can be characterized as a
terrorist, but rather whether the words of the exemption clause apply to
him.
Gurung v. SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04870 
53. Id. at 232–34. 
54. See Saul, supra note 24. 
55. Id. at 3–6. 
56. Id.
 57. DUFFY, supra note 1, at 46. 
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A. Include and Only Then, Exclude 
In 1825, the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, said that “asylum was accepted
by international law as available to those fugitives who had suffered
undeserved enmity but not for those who had done something injurious 
to human society.”58 This expression, first reflected in extradition law, 
has also found its way into the 1951 Convention. Drafted at the end of 
World War II, the 1951 Convention excludes from its protection
individuals who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes, and acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN.59 The intrinsic link between 
“ideas of humanity, equity, and the concept of refuge” and exclusion of 
guilty individuals was considered necessary to maintain the humanitarian
character of asylum.60 There exists a presumption that any individual 
who has committed a serious crime is liable to be prosecuted. Also, any
such person automatically loses the protection of non-refoulement under 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention.61 
Although Article 1F has existed since the entry into force of the 1951
Convention, it was used sparingly by states in RSD procedures until
recently.62 Clearly, not all individuals, including those who have
participated in serious transgressions prior to seeking asylum have been
or should be excluded from international protection. While some
political struggles have indeed been discreditable, political struggles 
may rise to the level of persecution, and to deny international protection 
to individuals that may have suffered persecution as result of political 
58. Satvinder Singh Juss, Terrorism and the Exclusion of Refugee Status in the 
UK, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L., 465, 466 (2012). 
59. See 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1F. 
60. See Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme, Note on the Exclusion Clauses, 47th Session, ¶ 3, UN doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.29 
(May 30, 1997). 
61. See 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33. The protection of non-refoulement
under Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention can only be claimed by a refugee. Any
individual, who is disqualified from receiving international protection due to operation of
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention is not a refugee. Id.; see also Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, art. 14(2) Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 18, 1992) (disallowing the right of asylum to be invoked in cases where the 
individual seeking asylum is liable for prosecution for commission of serious non­
political crimes or for acts contrary to the purpose and principles of the UN).
62. The first large scale application of the exclusion clauses occurred in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the first comprehensive guidelines in
this regard were issued in September 2003. See Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in
the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 425, 465 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press,
2003). 
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conflict is to renege on the 1951 Convention.63 Furthermore, the rules of 
exclusion under the 1951 Convention are exceptionally stringent and are 
to be applied selectively. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status (RSD Handbook) states that “[c]onsidering the serious
consequences of exclusion for the person concerned, however, the
interpretation of these exclusion clauses must be restrictive.”64 
UNHCR agrees that in exceptional circumstances, such as where an
international indictment is pending against an individual or where entry 
into state territory has been forceful (e.g., through hijacking of a plane), 
there exist prima facie grounds to exclude an individual from protection 
of the 1951 Convention.65 For example, the UNSC has called upon member 
states to prohibit entry of senior officials of the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola on state territory,66 making an automatic 
denial of asylum, should it be claimed, likely. In certain circumstances,
membership of an organization charged with having committed excludable 
acts may also give rise to a rebuttal presumption of exclusion, in which 
case the burden of proof shifts to the applicant.67 However, such situations
are likely to be rare. The RSD Handbook states that details of an 
individual’s involvement in potentially excludable acts are likely to 
arise during the RSD procedures or even after a grant of refugee status,68 
and thus summary or accelerated RSD procedures for such individuals 
may not holistically address the complex issues of facts and credibility.69 
The general rule therefore is that a person has to be considered and
63. Satvinder Singh Juss, Complicity, Exclusion, and the “Unworthy” in Refugee 
Law, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q.,1, 2 & n.5 (2012). 
64. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 149, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) (hereinafter RSD 
Handbook).
65. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 465. 
66. See S.C. Res. 1127, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (Aug. 28, 1997); S.C. Res. 
1295, ¶¶ 22–24, U.N. SCOR 55th year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1295 (Apr. 18, 2000); S.C. 
Res. 1336, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1336 (Jan. 23, 2001). 
67. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 19, HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003) (hereinafter Exclusion Guidelines).
68. RSD Handbook, supra note 64, ¶ 141. 
69. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 465. 
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assessed for refugee status under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention,70 
and only when such determination is successful can a case be made for
exclusion under Article 1F. The 1951 Convention is premised on the 
norm of inclusion,71 making all such individuals who meet the criteria of
refugee under Article 1(A)(2) eligible for grant of refugee status, unless 
proved otherwise. 
If, as Gilbert argues, Article 1F is applied before the determination of 
refugee status under Article 1(A)(2), it gives rise to the presumption that
all individuals claiming international protection are excludable therefrom.72 
If the wording of Article 1F (“This Convention shall not apply”) is
interpreted literally, it will neglect the humanitarian character of the
1951 Convention and shift the focus from persecution and well-founded 
fear, and transform the Convention into a tool to detect criminals and
offenders. State practice prior to 9/11 also presents evidence of general 
acceptance of this “include and only then exclude” norm. The European
Commission’s draft Directive on Asylum Procedures stated that where
“there are serious reasons for considering that the grounds of Article 
1(F) . . . apply,” member states shall not consider this as “grounds for
dismissal of applications for asylum as manifestly unfounded.”73 
Additionally, case law from United Kingdom,74 France,75 and to some
extent Canada,76 indicates that this norm has been followed. 
This practice however appears to be changing—the inclusion criteria 
under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention is now being narrowly 
interpreted, while the scope of Article 1F appears to be expanding. In
some jurisdictions, eligibility bars have existed since the early 1990’s. 
For example, in 1992, the Federal Court of Canada held that if the claimant 
falls within Article 1F, then there is no need to consider whether the 
claimant falls within Article 1A(2).77 However, the events of 9/11 have
 70. Id.; see also In re S.K. (unreported) Refugee Status Appeals Authority, No. 
29/91, 17 February 1992 (New Zealand), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
3ae6b7410.html.
 71. RSD Handbook, supra note 64, at ¶ 39 (stating, “It may be assumed that, 
unless he seeks adventure or just wishes to see the world, a person would not normally
abandon his home and country without some compelling reason.”). 
72. See Gilbert, supra note 62 at 466. 
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
74. O v. Immigration Appeals Tribunal and Secretary of State for Home [1995] 
Imm. A. R. 494. 
75. See Daniella Rudy, International Terrorism, An Excludable Act Within the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 2004)(unpublished thesis)(on file 
with University of Leiden Institute of Immigration Law) at 16 & n.49–51. 
76. Id.
 77. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 464–65. See also Resolution on Manifestly
Unfounded Applications for Asylum, The Council, Conclusions of the Meeting of the 
Ministers responsible for Immigration Doc. 10579/92 IMMIG, ¶ 11 (London, 30 Nov.-1 
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prompted an exponential increase in the use of the exclusion clause in 
RSD proceedings because the normative underlying assumption is that 
terrorists are misusing the asylum systems.
This heightened paranoia surrounding the misuse of the institution of 
asylum partly a result of the latent connections between asylum and 
terrorism that have been established through various UN General Assembly 
and UNSC Resolutions. Resolution 49/60 on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 
1994 for the first time exhorted States to “take appropriate measures, 
before granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker 
has not engaged in terrorist activities.”78 Subsequently, beginning in 
1999, the UNSC has adopted five separate resolutions that reiterate the 
relationship between asylum and terrorism. Four of these resolutions—
Resolutions 1373, 1377, 1566, and 1624—were adopted after the 
occurrence of 9/11. Resolution 1373 calls upon States to, ‘[take]
appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national 
and international law, including international standards of human rights,
before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-
seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of
terrorist acts’79 
Resolution 1373 gives the inaccurate impression that the individuals
responsible for 9/11 had in fact abused the refugee and asylee system to
enter the United States. Resolution 1373 and others have been criticized
by academics and practitioners alike. The criticisms range from the 
inherent contradictions between the Resolutions and the principle of 
nullem crimnen sine lege and that the Resolutions imply a new category
of exclusion under Article 1F, pertaining to terrorism and terrorist activity.
Subsequent to the adoption of Resolution 1373, many states have adopted
legislative regulations (in the form of eligibility bars) that peremptorily
Dec. 1992). This Resolution does not affect national provisions of Member States for
considering under accelerated procedures, where they exist, other cases where an urgent
resolution of the claim is necessary, in which it is established that the applicant has 
committed a serious offence in the territory of the Member States, if a case manifestly
falls within the situations mentioned in Article 1.F of the 1951 Geneva Convention, or 
for serious reasons of public security, even where the cases are not manifestly unfounded
in accordance with paragraph 1. Id. (emphasis added). 
78. G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 22, at ¶ 5. See also, G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 
25, at ¶ 3. 
79. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5. See also S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 
(Oct. 8, 2004)  (adopting a working definition of terrorism). 
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disqualify a person from seeking asylum where there are serious grounds
to believe that they have participated in terrorist activities. As Juss points 
out, the legislative and judicial pronouncements post-9/11 have created a 
standalone international framework under which a presumption exists 
that some individuals are automatically unworthy of refugee status.80 
These changes do not strictly align with the exclusion clause under the 1951 
Convention,81 and UNHCR has reinforced the necessity to apply such 
eligibility bars only if in conformity with Article 1F provisions.82 
B. Article 1F of the 1951 Convention
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention provides: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside	 the country of
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.83 
The exclusion clause under Article 1F fuses terminology from international
humanitarian and criminal law (Article 1F(a)), extradition law (Article 
1F(b)), and the UN Charter (Article 1F(c)). The provisions of Article 1F 
are exhaustive and do not include the ground of terrorism or terrorist 
80. See Juss, supra note 63, at 2. See also George Okoth-Obbo, Dir., Int’l Prot. 
Servs., Keynote Speech on Preserving the Institution of Asylum and Refugee Protection 
in the Context of Counter-Terrorism: the Problem of Terrorist Mobility (Oct. 31, 2007), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2007-nairobi/docs/UNHCR_
keynote.pdf. See also Dr. M v. Federal Republic of Germany, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
809 (Dec. 4, 2011) (where the Administrative Court reiterated the unworthiness 
principle).
81.  See infra Part III.C.
82. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Addressing Security Concerns Without 
Undermining Refugee Protection, UNHCR Position Paper, ¶ 3, (Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c0b880e0.html. Despite formal protests against the 
linkages being established between the institution of asylum and terrorism, the UNHCR 
also in part lends credence to these linkages. As Saul indicates, UNHCR considers all 
resolutions and declarations culminated under the UN General Assembly as binding 
norms of international law for the purposes of its functioning, thus tacitly granting
legitimacy to the very normative framework it opposes. See Ben Saul, Protecting Refugees in 
the Global ‘War on Terror’ (Sydney Ctr. for Int’l Law, Working Paper Oct. 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292604. 
83.  1951 Convention, supra note 7.
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activity;84 therefore, only such acts that fall within the scope of each of 
the individual clauses of Article 1F may be used as a basis for exclusion. 
In order to exclude an individual from international protection under 
the 1951 Convention, individual responsibility in relation to the specific 
offences enumerated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) must be established.
Thus, it must be shown that an individual committed the material elements 
of offences (actus reus) with knowledge and intent (mens rea). Individual 
participation does not require physical commission of the act and can be
established even where joint criminal enterprise is proved.85 
The UNHCR Guidelines on Exclusion do not provide any standalone
procedures to determine individual responsibility but instead reference 
the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals in this regard.86 
84. While the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
did exclude from IRO’s mandate persons who had “participated in any terrorist organization”
after the war, the drafters of the 1951 Convention explicitly decided not to read into the
exclusion clauses the ground of terrorism, indicating that the provisions of Article 1F 
were broad enough to exclude terrorist suspects. The use of the term terrorist is considered 
merely adjectival in nature, which does not expound upon the legal framework of exclusion.
See Ben Saul, Exclusion of Suspect Terrorists from Asylum: Trends in International and 
European Law, in INST. INT’L INTEGRATION STUDIES DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 26, at 1, 5–7
(July 2004), available at http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/abstracts/IIISDP26.php.
See also Saul, supra note 82, at 6.
 85. See U.N. High Comm’r Refugees, Background Note on the Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
¶¶ 53–55 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html 
(hereinafter UNHCR Background Note). 
86. Id. at ¶¶ 51–55 (stating that, “individual responsibility, and therefore the basis 
for exclusion, arises where the individual committed, or made a substantial contribution 
to, the criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the 
criminal conduct.” Quoting the International Military Tribunal at Nurenberg, the Note 
requires that a person be found guilty only where he is “personally implicated” in the 
commission of the acts in question taking into account that “the criterion for criminal 
responsibility . . . lies in moral freedom, in the perpetrator’s ability to choose with respect to
the act of which he is accused.” Paragraph 52 thereafter draw on the jurisprudence of the
ICTY, in particular the judgment in the case of Kvocka et al (Omarska and Keraterm 
camps) IT-98-30/1, Trial Chamber judgment, paragraph 122, 2 November 2001, where 
instigating was described as prompting of another person to commit an offence, with the 
“intent to induce the commission of the crime or in the knowledge that there was a 
substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime was a probably consequence.” Id.
at ¶ 52. “Commission of a crime. . . was considered to arise from the physical perpetration of
a crime or from engendering a culpable omission in violation of the criminal, in the
knowledge that there was a substantial likelihood that the commission of the crime 
would be the consequence of the particular conduct.” Id. “Aiding and abetting requires 
the individual to have rendered a substantial contribution to the commission of a crime in 
the knowledge that this will assist or facilitate the commission of the offence. Id. at ¶ 53.
 319
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The chapeau to Article 1F provides that there be “serious reasons for 
considering” that one or more of the subparagraphs of Article 1F has been
satisfied. There is no clarity on what “serious reasons for considering” 
means. The standard does not imply that an applicant should have been 
formally charged or convicted, or that his criminality be established 
“beyond reasonable doubt” through a judicial procedure, although the 
Background Note on Exclusion indicates that the test of “balance of 
probabilities” is too low a threshold.87 
In terms of interpretative and legislative guidance, Article 1F(a) is 
comparatively less ambiguous than Articles 1F(b) and 1F(c).88 It relies 
on various instruments of international humanitarian and criminal law to
define its jurisdictional purview. As such, any terrorist attack89 that can 
The Note at paragraph 53 states that for aiding and abetting, “[t]he contribution may be 
in the form of practical assistance, encouragement or moral support and must have a 
substantial (but not necessarily causal) effect on the perpetration of the crime. Aiding or
abetting may consist of an act or omission and may take place before, during or after the 
commission of the crime, although the requirement of a substantial contribution must
always be borne in mind, especially when failure to act is in question.”) Id. 
87. See id. at ¶ 107. Judicial precedents have however interpreted that serious 
reasons “implies something less than the criminal or civil standards.” Gurung v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] UKIAT 04870, [95]. On this aspect 
alone, the UK Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning in Gurung in the case of R (on the
application of JS) (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] 
UKSC 15, [39]
. . . Clearly the Tribunal in Gurung was right to highlight ‘the lower standard 
of proof applicable in exclusion clause cases’—lower than that applicable in
actual war crimes trials. That said, ‘serious reasons for considering’ obviously
imports a higher test for exclusion than . . . an expression like ‘reasonable 
grounds for suspecting.’ ‘Considering’ approximates rather to ‘believing’ than 
to ‘suspecting.’
88. Although the UNHCR Statute refers specifically to Article VI of the London
Charter of the International Military Tribunal to define the jurisdiction of exclusion for
war crimes, crimes against humanity et al., no such restriction is placed on the interpretative
reference for Article 1F of the 1951 Convention. In light of the development in the field 
of International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, in interpreting 
Article 1F(a), regard should be had to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1977 Additional 
Protocols, the 1984 Convention, the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of
Mankind, U.N. GAOR 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/332 (July 30, 1996), and the Statutes 
of ICTY, ICTR, ICC and related jurisprudence. 
89. The Geneva Additional Protocols I and II were negotiated in the 1970s in the 
wake of terrorist activities during that period and it is only logical to consider the
condemnation contained in the Protocols extends to the use of terror as well. See Michael 
P. Scharf and Michael A. Newtown, Terrorism and Crimes Against Humanity, in
FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, 262, 268 (Sadat Leila ed.,
2011). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 584 U.S. 557, 557, 562 (2006) (where the violence 
between the US and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was classified as non-international armed 
conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was applicable).
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rise to the level of crime against humanity90 will be covered under Article
1F(a) of the 1951 Convention as long as it is part of an “organizational 
policy”91 and individual complicity in its commission can be demonstrated.
Recent judicial precedents from the international criminal tribunals also
outlaw the deliberate use of terror as a military tactic,92 which would be
applicable to terrorism if it were indeed established as a crime against
humanity.
Article 1F(c) has rarely been used as a ground for exclusion since there is
no clarity on what qualifies as “acts contrary to the purposes and principles
90. The understanding of crimes against humanity has evolved from being restricted to
times of armed conflict alone to peacetime as well. The first reference was in the ICTY 
decision, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 141, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia  May 7, 1997), where the Court held that “[C]ustomary international 
law may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at 
all.”
91. In Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998]
1 S.C.R. 982, 984, the Canadian Supreme Court held that, “[a]lthough it may be more
difficult for a non-State actor to perpetrate human rights violations on a scale amounting
to persecution without the State thereby implicitly adopting those acts, the possibility
should not be excluded a priori.”
UNHCR takes a similar view as regards the causal nexus between persecution and 
agents of persecution, i.e., persecution can be caused by non-State actors and will qualify
for international protection under the 1951 Convention in cases where the State is unable 
to or unwilling to offer protection from such persecution. See RSD Handbook, supra
note 64, at ¶ 65. See also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Position Paper on
Claims for Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
based on a Fear of Persecution due to an Individual’s Membership of a Family or Clan 
engaged in a Blood Feud, ¶¶ 9–12 (Mar. 17, 2006) available at http://www.refworld.org/ 
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=44201a574. See also, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
Guidelines on International Protection: Gender Related Persecution within the Context 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, HCR/GIP/02/01, ¶¶ 19–21 (May 7, 2002); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” 
within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/02/02, ¶¶ 20–23, (May 7, 2002). See also
Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic and Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T  (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2004). 
92. E.g., Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-Y, Judgment and Opinion, ¶¶ 66, 
94–100, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (holding that the 
prohibition against terror is a specific prohibition within the general prohibition of attack 
on civilians . . . constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.). See also Prosecutor
v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Judgment ¶ 70 (Feb. 22, 
2008). See also Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Amended Indictment,
¶¶ 44–52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia  Apr. 28, 2000) (including the 
charge of unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians). 
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of the United Nations.”93 While Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter 
enumerate situations contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN,
there is no exhaustive list of crimes which may qualify.  Moreover, unlike 
paragraphs (a) and (b) where culpability is associated with commission of a
crime, Article 1F(c) unambiguously requires establishment of guilt. 
Although Resolution 1373 designated terrorism as an offence against the 
purposes and principles of the UN, Gilbert and others argue that the 
language of the provision implicates only those who may hold significant 
positions of authority, including a member of a non-State organization,94 
and any other individual excludable for the offence of terrorism or 
terrorist activity should be considered under Article 1F(b). 
Under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention, international protection
will not extend to an asylum seeker if he has committed a serious, non­
political crime outside the country of refuge and prior to admission.95 
Although UNHCR considers Article 1F(b) to be the most suitable provision 
for excluding those affiliated with terrorism and terrorist activities,96 and 
while terrorism has indeed been designated as a non-political crime in
many jurisdictions,97 there are no ascribed definitions of the material
elements of this provision, i.e., serious, non-political crime. UNHCR has 
specified that international rather than local standards must be considered in
determining whether a particular offence falls within the ambit of Article
1F(b).98 Additionally, the factors to be considered include the nature of
the act, the actual harm inflicted, the form of procedure used to prosecute
 93. See Singh, supra note 28, at 116 & n.143. 
94. While non-State actors may not be a priori excluded from the purview of 
these provisions, under the UN Charter, only States can perpetrate acts contrary to the 
principles and purposes of the UN. Pursing the same line of argument, while a non-State 
actor like the AQAM can be held liable for perpetrating an act within Article 1F(c), the 
argument that it be applicable only to people extremely high in the hierarchy of the State 
is reasonable. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 455–57. See also GUY GOODWIN-GILL &
JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108, 113 (3d ed. 1998). See also 
Singh, supra note 28, at 116–17. See also RSD Handbook, supra note 64, at ¶ 163. 
95. See 1951 Convention, supra note 7, at art 1F, Article 1F(a) and 1F(c) whereby
prescribed crimes may be committed whenever and wherever including in the country of
refuge. An individual who commits a serious non-political crime in the country of refuge 
however cannot be excluded under Article 1F(c) and may be expelled under Articles 32
and 33 of the 1951 Convention. In the latter case, the decision to expel will not affect the 
prior grant of refugee status, if made. 
96. See Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 67, at ¶¶ 25–26. 
97. The offence of terrorism has been domestically held to violate the principles
and purposes of the UN in jurisdictions such as United Kingdom and Germany. See 
Singh, supra note 28, at 115 & n.136, 117 & n.148. See also UNHCR Background Note, 
supra note 85, at 15 & nn.31, 33. 
98. Since serious has different meaning in different legal systems, the gravity of a
crime can and should not be judged by characterization in either the country of origin or 
refuge. See UNHCR Background Note, supra note 85, at ¶ 38. 
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the crime, the nature of the penalty, and whether most jurisdictions would
consider it a serious crime.99 Although it is largely a domestic court’s
discretion to determine whether a particular crime falls within Article 1F(b), 
the court’s assessment must weigh the seriousness of the crime and its 
proportionality to the persecution feared.100 
Many national courts draw upon extradition law to define political 
crimes101 although among the existing bilateral extradition treaties, there
is little commonality in the definition of a political crime.102 Moreover,
not every extraditable offence will result in exclusion from international 
protection under the 1951 Convention.103 Only cases in which the political
goal is consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms does the 
UNCHR consider the crime to be political in nature. Important factors in 
99. See UNHCR Background Note, supra note 85, at ¶¶ 39–40. See also RSD 
Handbook, supra note 64, at ¶ 155 (listing murder, rape, and armed robbery as example
that would undoubtedly qualify as serious offences, whereas petty theft would not). 
100. See Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 67, at ¶ 24. See also Rudy, supra note
75, at 19–20 & n.60. 
101. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 94, at 103. See also McMullen v. INS, 788
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986). See also T v. Secretary of State for Home Department [1005]
Imm. A. R. 142, where Lord Lloyd of Berwick said: 
It was common ground that the words ‘non political crime’ must bear the same 
meaning as they do in extradition law. Indeed, as it appears from the travaux 
preparatoires that the framers of the convention had extradition law in mind 
when drafting the convention, and intended to make use of the same concept . . . 
102. See European Council on Refugees and Exile, Position on Exclusion from 
Refugee Status, ¶¶ 20–21 & nn.30, 34 and accompanying text, PP1/03/2004/Ext/CA
(Mar. 2004).
103. While Article 1F(b) does indeed derive from extradition law, the purpose of
extradition law is diametrically opposite to the purpose of Article 1F(b). First, extradition
law results from either national or at best, bilateral agreements between states as against
Article 1F(b) which is part of an international law treaty negotiated amongst states. Thus 
while the norms of extradition law can vary as per agreement between states, the norms
under Article 1F(b) have to be uniform, given the element of universality. Second, the 
purpose of a political crime under extradition law is to protect an individual who may
suffer undue punishment/ prosecution for his political acts, if returned. However, Article 
1F(b) use of the serious crime terminology is for the purposes of not granting protection
to an individual who may have committed such a crime. Moreover, it is argued that if it 
was indeed the intention of comity of nations to include the reference to extradition in
Article 1F(b), the same would have been incorporated, like it is, in Article 7(d) of the 
UNHCR Statute that deals with exclusion (“. . . that he has committed a crime covered 
by the provisions of treaties of extradition . . .”). E.g., T v. Secretary of State for Home
Department [1996] 2 All E.R. 865, 885 (stating that in extradition cases, “the political
nature of the offence is an exception to a general duty to return the fugitive, whereas in 
relation to asylum there is a general duty not to perform a refoulement unless the crime is
non-political.” (emphasis added)). 
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evaluating the political nature of a crime are the motivation, context, and 
methods of the crime and proportionality between the crime and its
objectives.104 Thus, where a serious crime is disproportionate to the
alleged political objective, it should be considered a non-political crime. 
The discussion in part II of the paper demonstrates that despite
disagreements over the generic meaning of terrorism, international law 
considers its various manifestations as serious crimes.105  The violence
perpetrated by terrorism, no matter the motivations, is usually
disproportionate and thus the crime of terrorism will not qualify as non­
political under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention.
C. When Norms Collide: Incoherence and Indeterminacy of
 
Post-9/11 Exclusion in the United States
 
While states have long dealt with exclusion considerations, the attacks 
of 9/11 incited states to engage in a rapid, albeit uncoordinated, process 
of norm-creation and implementation to ensure that while their borders 
remain open to those genuinely in need of protection, individuals who 
pose a current or future threat to national security were denied admission. In
the preceding sections of this paper, I have separately analysed the legal
norms applicable to terrorism and those that are applicable to exclusion
under the 1951 Convention. While the legal norms applicable to anti-
terrorism demonstrate a significant degree of incoherence across states,
regional, and even multilateral bodies, the norms applicable to exclusion 
under the 1951 Convention display a significant degree of coherence but 
are not necessarily determinate. This indeterminacy results from the
often-inconsistent treatment in State practice of similarly situated cases
and from expansive or narrow interpretations of the provisions by domestic 
courts.106 
104. See UNHCR Background Note, supra note 85, at ¶ 41. 
105. See, e.g., T v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All 
E.R. 865, 875, where Lord Mustill observed,
Another, and rather different, impulse was also opposed to the universal reception
of refugees; namely the acknowledgement that terror as a means of gaining
what might loosely be described as political ends posed a danger not only to
individual states, but also to the community of nations. 
106. Under Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states
cannot justify the failure to meet international treaty obligations based on their domestic 
laws (although they do). 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  A very good example of such differential 
treatment can be seen with regard to outlawing of terrorist groups. While in the United
States, the Hezbollah is a banned terrorist outfit, the same is not the case within the 
European Union, although some feebale attempts have been recently been made in this 
regard in EU. See also R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan
and Aitseguer, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 202, 213 (2001), where the House of Lords 
observed: 
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Neither the internal incoherence within the regime of anti-terrorism
law nor the indeterminacy of exclusion under the 1951 Convention pose 
a problem per se. Norm generation in international law is indeed a slow, 
incremental process and no lasting norm within either field can result
without undergoing this process. However, when this incoherence and
indeterminacy interact, conflict arises between not only the norms 
themselves, but also the institutions that implement these norms.107 Saul
explains that such incoherence and indeterminacy problematizes the very
operation of multilateral obligations.108 
In the context of exclusion from grant of asylum, this conflict is apparent 
both at procedural and substantive levels. Procedurally, the 1951
Convention requires that there be appropriate and necessary evidence to
establish an individual’s culpability in acts which merit exclusion. Thus, 
direct and actual commission of an excludable offence has to be necessarily 
established as opposed to participation by way of omission or simply by
association.109 Second, the determination of culpability must be on a case-
It follows that, as in the case of other multilateral treaties . . . must be given an
independent meaning derivable from the sources mentioned in Articles 31 and 
32 [of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969] and without 
taking color from distinctive features of the legal system of any individual 
contracting state. In principle therefore there can be only one true interpretation of a
treaty . . . In practice it is left to national courts, faced with a material disagreement
on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in doing so it must search . . . for 
the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And there can
only be one true meaning. 
107. See Ben Saul, Terrorism and International Criminal Law: Questions of
(In)Coherence and (Il)Legitimacy, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGITIMACY 
AND COHERENCE 190, 191 (Gideon Boas et al. eds., 2012). 
108. Id. The norm of non-refoulement is accepted as a peremptory norm of 
international law. It is therefore debatable whether Security Council Resolutions, even 
those which are adopted under Chapter VII (for e.g. as under Res. 1373 to criminalize 
terrorist acts under domestic law) can legally require member states to implement domestic 
law which impinge on and curtails the peremptory norm of non-refoulement See, e.g.,
Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05  P and C-415/05 P, E. C. R. ¶¶ 323, 331–72 (Sept. 
3, 2008). See also Al Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 102 
(July 7, 2011) (where the ECHR observed that in interpreting Security Council Resolutions,
“there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any
obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights,” absent 
clear and explicitly language to the contrary).
109. See e.g., R (on the application of JS) (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2010] UKSC 15 (holding that mere membership of an organization
which is committed to the use of violence for political ends is not enough to bring an
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by-case level and not en masse.110 This implicitly forbids the use of
automatic bars to refugee status based on a list of excludable crimes. 
Substantively, it is necessary to establish that the individual has committed
or substantially contributed to at least one or more of the acts specified
in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of Article 1F.111 
However, in the post-9/11 scenario, these procedural and substantive 
safeguards have largely been weakened or completely ignored. Most states
have enacted or reinforced the terrorism exception to the grant of asylum 
under their domestic procedures.112 While the UNSC developments113 
oblige states to implement such measures, these exceptions obfuscate the 
difference between two specialised fields of law, i.e., anti-terrorism law
and refugee law. After the occurrence of 9/11, what states have largely 
implemented are amendments to their domestic anti-terrorism laws.
However, pursuant to the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1373, these laws
have become operable not only as anti-terrorism measures but also as
eligibility bars for asylum. They expand the purview of exclusion under 
appellant within the exclusion clauses). Cf. Gurung v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2002] UKIAT 04870, HX34452-2001 (Immigration Appeal Tribunal)
(holding that mere membership of a terrorist organization is sufficient for the purposes of 
exclusion). See also Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, (Jan. 11, 2002) (holding that 
Suresh, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent was excluded from non-refoulement
protection under Article 33(2) of the 1951 merely on account of his association with the 
LTTE. The Court held that a balancing act between the protection needs of the claimant 
and national security interests of Canada are permissible but only on accordance with
principles of fundamental justice as defined under Canadian municipal law and
applicable international law. However, the Canadian view of complicity is by far the 
most conservative.). See Juss, supra note 63, at 23–26. 
110. See Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 67, at ¶¶ 18, 21. 
111. See e.g. Thayabaran v. SSHD (12250; Oct. 9, 1998) in which the Tribunal 
opined that introduction of other concepts in consideration and determination of whether
an individual had committed an excludable offence under Article 1F(b) was not helpful.
In the words of the Tribunal, “. . . the question is not whether the claimant can be 
characterized as a terrorist but whether the words of the exemption clauses apply to
him.” 
112. In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed the principle that the 
purpose of Article 1F was two pronged: to protect the order and security of the receiving
state, and to preserve the moral integrity of the Convention. In Joesoebov v. Netherlands, 
App. No. 44719/06, 3 Eur. H.R. ¶ 57 (Nov. 2, 2010), the Court held 
. . . the Court’s settled case-law that Contracting States have the right, as a
matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations,
including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of 
aliens, and that the right to political asylum is not explicitly protected by either
the Convention or its Protocol. 
113. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
requires member states to criminalize terrorism in their domestic law. However since 
there is no definition of terrorism prescribed under the said Resolution and therefore no
indication of what acts are specifically to be criminalized, states have unilaterally 
defined terrorism leading to variance in the kind of offences criminalized.
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the 1951 Convention by operating in addition to Article 1F (because there 
are no corresponding grounds of terrorism and terrorist activity),114 leading 
to a fractured and piecemeal interpretation of the exclusion clause.115 
Nowhere has this unobstructed, yet unjustified, intrusion of anti-terrorism 
law within the normative framework of refugee law become more apparent 
than in United States jurisprudence.116 The asylum and refugee resettlement 
114. Practitioners and academics in the field of refugee law such as Ben Saul, 
Geoff Gilbert, James Hathaway, and Guy Goodwin-Gill have extensively spoken about
the obfuscation of the principles contained in Articles 1F and 33(2) of the 1951 
Convention when states implement the 1951 Convention in their domestic jurisdictions. 
The purpose of Article 1F is to disqualify an individual from the grant of refugee status. 
The purpose of Article 33(2) is to withdraw the protection of refoulement already
granted to a refugee. Article 1F cannot be applied to disqualify or exclude a person who
may be considered to be danger to the country of refuge or its community—that
objective is served by Article 33(2). However, Article 33(2) is applicable to refugees—
not to asylum seekers. There is thus the logical consistency that Article 1F is for purposes of
exclusion, for acts done prior to grant of refugee status while Article 33(2) is only
applicable in cases where an individual, who has already received international protection in a
country of refuge, participates in such acts as would qualify him to be a danger to the 
security of the country or to the community of the country within the country of refuge. 
Expulsion on grounds of national security is however covered under Article 32 of the 
1951 Convention. Needless to say, all these three provisions cover different situations—
exclusion concerns under Article 1F arising after grant of refugee status are addressed 
through ‘Cancellation’ proceedings (ex tunc—status is cancelled because its grant was
void ab inito). Withdrawal of non-refoulement protection under Articles 32 and 33(2) are 
addressed through ‘Cessation’ proceedings (ex nunc—the initial grant of refugee status 
was valid but subsequent activities have indicated that the individual is no longer deserving of
protection). Because the withdrawal of protection under Articles 32 and 33(2) is
violation of a peremptory norm, the standard of proof required to establish an Article 
33(2) violation is even higher than the standard of proof required under Article 1F. 
115. See T v. Secretary of State for Home Dep’t, supra note 96. See also Januzi v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKHL 5, [4] (appeal taken from EWCA)
(U.K.), wherein the Court held
The Convention must be interpreted as an international instrument, not a 
domestic statute, in accordance with the rules prescribed in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. As a human rights instrument the Convention should 
not be given a narrow or restricted interpretation. . . . The starting point of the 
construction exercise must be the text of the Convention itself . . . because it 
expresses what the parties to it have agreed. The parties to an international 
convention are not to be treated as having agreed to something they did not 
agree, unless it is clear by necessary implication from the text or from uniform 
acceptance by states that they would have agreed or have subsequently done 
so. The court has ‘no warrant to give effect to what state parties might, or in an 
ideal world, have agreed. (citations omitted).
116. Similar terrorism exceptions have been created in other common law 
jurisdictions as well, most notably in the United Kingdom, where Section 54 of the Terrorism
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system in the United States has undergone a dramatic change post-9/11. 
Both security and legislative measures were enhanced in order to counter 
the potential misuse of asylum. As Cianciarulo notes, the United States
suspended its refugee resettlement program for many months in response 
to 9/11.117 During this period, new measures put into place for background 
checks were made retroactively applicable to even those individuals who 
had been accepted for resettlement prior to the occurrence of 9/11.118 In 
2002, the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS)
was launched, and special registration requirements were imposed on
temporary visitors from designated countries of origin—”[twenty-four]
of the twenty-five countries on the list were predominantly Muslim.”119 
In 2003, Operation Liberty Shield was implemented, wherein all asylum 
applicants from “nations where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and other
terrorist groups are known to have operated” were detainable for the entire
duration of the processing of their asylum application. 120 
Prior to 9/11, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the 
1980 Refugee Act, governed the grant of asylum within the United States.
The INA, grounded in national security interests, excluded aliens who
may enter the United States to engage in espionage, sabotage, or other 
subversive activities “prejudicial to public interest” from refugee 
protection.121 It also denied admission to aliens who had advocated for
or been affiliated with any organization that supported anti-United States 
views such as communism or anarchy,122 and provided for summary
exclusion of aliens posing a menace to the security of United States.123 
The Refugee Act made the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
operational in United States domestic law and also prescribed procedures 
for adjudication of asylum.124 
Act, 2006 requires (the Section uses the language “. . . shall be taken as including. . .”) 
that an individual be assessed for exclusion under Article 1(F)(c) of the 1951 Convention
where he is alleged to have participated in terrorism and/or allied activities. Other
jurisdictions which have implemented similar norms include the European Union, 
Germany, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands. For a comparative analysis of terrorism
exceptions see Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States: Transporting Best Practices, 33 FORDHAM INT’L 
L. J. 300 (2010). 
117. See Cianciarulo, supra note 6, at 1135–42. 
118. Id.
119. See Maryellen Fullerton, Terrorism, Torture and Refugee Protection in the United
States, 29:4 REFUGEE SURVEY QUARTERLY, 4, 8–9 (Dec. 2010). 
120. Id. at 9. 
121. See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Exception to Asylum: Managing the Uncertainty
in Status Determination, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 674 & nn.30–31 (2008). 
122. Id. at 647 & n.32. 
123. Id. at 674 & n.33. 
124. Id. at 674–75. 
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The provisions of the INA which form the core of U.S. substantive
law on exclusion have been progressively amended since the 1990s to 
now incorporate provisions from legislation such as the 1996 Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the 2001 USA
PATRIOT Act, and the 2005 REAL ID Act.125 The cumulative effect of 
these amendments is that now there is a complex and expansive terrorism 
exception in the INA that severely restricts the admissibility of individuals 
to United States territory. 
The INA provides that no alien is eligible for grant of asylum if 
[T]he alien is described in subclause (I), (II), (III) (IV), or (VI) of [8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)] or [§ 1227(a)(4)(B)] (relating to terrorist activity), unless, in
the case only of an alien described in subclause (IV) of [§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)], the 
Attorney General determines, in the Attorney General’s discretion, that there are
not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the 
United States. . .126 
Section 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) in turn excludes two categories of individuals: 
those who have engaged or are likely to engage in terrorist activity; and 
those who are affiliated with terrorist organizations in different capacities.127 
The INA defines terrorist activity, provides a tripartite breakdown of 
terrorist organizations, and also lists activities that qualify as engaging in 
a terrorist activity.128 Under the INA, terrorist activity is defined as “any 
activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is
committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States,
would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State)” and
includes inter alia the use of an “explosive, firearm, or other weapons or 
dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with 
intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.”129 Engaging in
125. For an extensive chronological analysis of the amendments made to INA in
light of domestic anti-terrorism legislations, see Fullerton, supra note 119, at 12–19. 
126. See Immigration and National Act of 1952 § 101(a)(42), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 
66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) 2006). 
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(VI) (2006). See also Thayabaran, supra note 
111. An individual “likely to engage” in a terrorism related activity cannot be pre­
empted from grant of asylum under these eligibility bars if they correspond to Article 1F 
of the 1951 Convention.
 128. See Kidane, supra note 116, at 319. 
129. Id. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the United States has
often taken a very hardline position when it comes to interpretation of the terrorism 
exception. Thus, Saman Kareem Ahmed, who had served the U.S. forces in Iraq and 
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terrorist activity includes all forms of preparation, incitation, solicitation 
(of funds, other materials, or membership), and provision of material
support.130 Material support in turn is defined as providing even on a 
singular occasion, “a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, 
transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation 
or identification, weapons, explosives or training.”131 Although the INA
does not contain any provision that implicates membership in an
organization as an exclusionary bar, Department of State Guidelines shifts
the burden of proof on this issue to the individual claiming asylum.132 Thus,
arrived in the United States, among others, on recommendation of General David 
Petraeus, on a special visa available to those who had assisted U.S. forces in Iraq was
denied adjustment of status and had his asylum revoked because it was alleged that 
previously served the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) which was considered to be a 
terrorist organization. See Kidane, supra note 116, at 320–22 & n.121–24. See also
Kidane, supra note 121, at 690–91. 
130. For example, in SS v. SSHD, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC) of the United Kingdom excluded a Libyan from grant of asylum and argued that 
based on UNSC Resolution 1624, “it is the duty of states to deny safe haven to those
who have committed a terrorist act.” SS (Libya) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1547 [12]. The Court of Appeals granted the appeal 
and remitted the case back to SIAC for reconsideration. See id. Characterization of 
material support as direct commission of the offence of terrorism is likely to be dangerous
because it can result in a higher and different punishment than actually required. For 
example, an individual responsible for terrorist activities may be a legitimate target
under IHL as well as regular criminal law enforcement. IHL being lex specialis for 
situations of armed conflict, if activities such as financing, recruitment, solicitation or
other forms of material support are indeed qualified as direct participation, it will lead to
disproportionate punishment, not to mention that such individual may be considered as
legitimate military targets, which is not allowed under regular criminal enforcement
mechanism.
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).  How such a stringent material support 
provision can potentially lead to absurd determinations is demonstrated in Matter of S-K
where the Board of Immigration Appeals held donations of $685, made over an 11 
month period to the Chin National Front, rendered an ethnic Chin woman illegible for 
asylum in the United States because in terms of legislative pronouncements she was a 
danger to the security of United States, despite having established a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 23 I&N Dec. 936, 946 (BIA 2006). Subsequently in 2010, the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725, 
held that providing training and teaching assistance in peaceful settlement of disputes to
organizations such as Kurdistan Worker’s Party or the LTTE also qualifies as material
support and “can further terrorism . . . [because it] frees up other resources within the 
organization that may be put to violent ends.” 
132. See Kidane, supra note 121, at 704 & nn.226–27. See also Juss, supra note 58,
at 496–97 &  n.125–28. The RSD Handbook provides as follows with respect to burden
and standard of proof: 
. . . the burden of proof in principal rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain
and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the 
examiner. . . The relevant facts of the individual case will have to be furnished
in the first place by the applicant himself. It will then be up to the person 
charged with determining his status . . . to assess the validity of any evidence and
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unless an individual can clearly and convincingly demonstrate that
he did not know or reasonably could not have known that his affiliation 
was with a terrorist organization, he is likely to be inadmissible under 
the provisions of INA.133 
Under AEDPA, thirty groups, including the PKK, LTTE, PMOI, and 
Al Qaeda, were designated as terrorist groups beginning in 1996. The 
assets of these organizations were frozen, although the group could 
challenge the designation within 30 days of it coming into force. In wake
of the events of 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act divided the categories of 
terrorist organizations into Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III. This categorization of
terrorist organizations has been incorporated in the INA. Tier I followed 
the designation procedure laid down under the AEDPA.134 Tier II is
comprised of groups designated by the Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
and Secretary of Homeland Security as having engaged in terrorist activity. 
Members of all Tier II groups are inadmissible to the United States and 
may face other negative consequences.135 However, while material support 
to any organization under Tier I is a criminal offence, the same does not 
hold true for Tier II groups.136 Both lists contain the names of specific
groups and organizations that are considered to be outlawed in the United
States and are public lists.137 
It is Tier III that is the most problematic. First, the definition of what 
constitutes a terrorist group for the purpose of Tier III is very elastic.
Tier III is applicable to any entity that is a “group of two or more
individuals, whether organized or not, which engaged in, or has a subgroup 
credibility . . . allowance for possible lack of evidence does not . . . mean that

unsupported statements must necessarily be accepted as true. . . The benefit of

doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been 

obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s 

general credibility. The applicant’ statements must be coherent and plausible, 

and must not run counter to generally known facts. The applicant should (i) tell 

the truth . . . to the full in establishing the facts of his case (ii) make an effort to 

support his statements by any available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation

for any lack of evidence (iii) supply all pertinent information concerning himself

and his past experience in as much detail as is necessary . . . to establish the





133. See Kidane, supra note 121, at 704 & n.226–27.
 134. See Fullerton, supra note 119, at 12–14. 
135. Id.
 136. See Cianciarulo, supra note 6. 
137. Id.
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which engages in terrorist activities.”138 There is no public list of groups
or organizations categorized as Tier III, review procedure through which
a particular group can assess or reassess its characterization as Tier III or an
appellate or review procedure exists where a group can challenge its 
designation under Tier III.139 Under the definition of Tier III organizations, 
even members of an umbrella, non-violent group or movement will be 
classified as engaging in terrorist activities if a subgroup allied with the 
umbrella group engages in any form of terrorist activity.140 Pursuant to
the REAL ID Act, even the spouse and children of those deemed
inadmissible to United States territory are barred from grant of asylum.141 
Individuals who are considered members of a terrorist organization,
whether under Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III, are automatically considered 
dangerous to the community in United States and inevitably ineligible for
protection extended by the norm of non-refoulement.142 
During the time when the terrorism exception was incorporated in the 
INA, the REAL ID Act also made the procedure for grant of asylum more
laborious and stringent.  Thus, credibility determination criteria have been
augmented, so omissions and inconsistencies in an individual’s testimony
 138. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
139. Id. The unavailability of review/appeal mechanism violates the basic fundamental 
rights of an individual. Article 10 of the 1979 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), and Articles 14 and 
16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(III) (Dec. 16, 1966), protect the right to fair trial of an individual.
Given that international human rights law forms the basis of international refugee protection, 
it is necessary that all fundamental human rights are applicable to those claiming asylum. 
See also Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 123–24
(June 20, 2002), where the Court held
Even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the
rule of law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental
human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before 
an independent body competent to review . . . The individual must be able to 
challenge the executive’s assertion that national security is at stake.
140. See Fullerton, supra note 119, at 14. 
141. Id. at 17 & n.59. Although the right to family unity is not explicitly recognized
under the 1951 Convention, the Convention does provide for protection of the refugee 
family. See RSD Handbook, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 185, 187–88. The benefit of the
principle of family unity operates in the favor of defendants and not against them. Id.
Therefore refugee status can be denied to a dependent, such as a spouse or a child, only
where the dependent himself/ herself falls under either of the exclusion clauses. Id. Thus, 
peremptory exclusion of dependents is a violation of the 1951 Convention.. Id. See also
U.N. High Comm’r Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination
under UNHCR’s mandate, § 4.8.7, HCRP/IP/4/Rev.1 (2005). 
142. See Kidane, supra note 121, at 683 & nn.89–90, 694 & n.175–77. Under the 
provisions of the INA, the grant of discretionary waiver is the exception. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A). The rule is that on determination of an individual as a threat to natural 
security, the person automatically becomes inadmissible to United States territory.
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have a negative impact on the claim,143 criteria for submission of 
corroborative evidence have been established,144 and it now mandatory 
that an individual establish the causal nexus between his flight, his
persecution, and the grounds on which asylum is granted (i.e., race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion).145 
V. CONCLUSION
The elasticity of criminal law when it comes to dealing with terrorism 
has given rise to a number of rule of law problems. Vague and opaque 
definitions of terrorism, material support, and “incitement to terrorism” 
and the use of criminal law modes of liability for punishment of ill-defined,
inchoate offences have given rise to concerns regarding the impact of the
fight against terrorism on individual fundamental rights. In fact, such
expansive interpretations only give rise to further discontent, thus feeding
the “War on Terror” with disgruntled fighters. The interaction of the fields
of counter terrorism law and refugee and asylum law is only developing
and the presence of conflicts around the world gives rise to a need for well 
carved out offences. However, in the quest for development of this area of
law, the guide should not be the criminal law enforcement machinery,
but the founding principles of the 1951 Convention—that of burden
sharing and humanitarianism. Anything less would be to deny the human 
rights criterion on which all egalitarian and ethical systems of justice 
should be based. 
143. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID 
Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 101, 132–35 (2006). 
144. Id.
 145. Id. As the interpretative guidance in the RSD Handbook indicates, the 
applicant themselves may not be aware of the reasons for persecution and neither it is an 
applicant’s duty to analyze and identify such reasons. This obligation is cast on the 
examiner who has to ascertain the reason for the persecution feared as also whether the
1951 Convention definition of a refugee is met or not. See RSD Handbook, supra note 
64, at ¶¶ 46, 66–67. 
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